OPINION — “Regardless of claims of battlefield momentum in Ukraine, the info exhibits that Russia is paying a rare worth for minimal positive factors and is in decline as a significant energy. Since February 2022, Russian forces have suffered almost 1.2 million casualties, extra losses than any main energy in any warfare since World Warfare II…After seizing the initiative in 2024, Russian forces have superior at a mean fee of between 15 and 70 meters per day of their most outstanding offensives, slower than nearly any main offensive marketing campaign in any warfare within the final century. In the meantime, Russia’s warfare economic system is below mounting pressure, with manufacturing declining, slowing progress of 0.6 p.c in 2025, and no globally aggressive expertise corporations to assist drive long-term productiveness.”
That’s a quote from Russia’s Grinding Warfare in Ukraine, a Middle for Strategic and Worldwide Research (CSIS) evaluation temporary by Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe, launched January 27, which says that “a detailed take a look at the info means that Russia is hardly successful [its war against Ukraine],” and, much more curiously, that “Russia is more and more a declining energy.”
Jones, President of CSIS’ Protection and Safety Division, and McCabe, Affiliate Fellow in CSIS’, Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program, not solely assess that “Russia’s total progress on the battlefield, particularly within the final two years, fall decisively in need of Moscow’s aim to militarily conquer Ukraine,” but additionally that “Russia’s economic system is exhibiting indicators of pressure, and long-term productiveness appears bleak.”
Let’s begin with the Jones/McCabe evaluation of the navy scenario and beneath take a look at their view of Moscow’s financial scenario.
Whereas saying assessing casualties and fatalities in wartime is troublesome and imprecise, and numerous sides have incentives to inflate or shrink the numbers for political functions, Jones/McCabe write that “In response to CSIS estimates, Russian forces suffered almost 1.2 million battlefield casualties, which embrace killed, wounded, and lacking, between February 2022 and December 2025…There have been roughly 415,000 Russian casualties in 2025 alone, with a mean of almost 35,000 casualties monthly. As well as, there have been roughly 275,000 to 325,000 Russian battlefield fatalities between February 2022 and December 2025.”
In comparison with the previous, the CSIS evaluation confirmed, “Russian battlefield fatalities in Ukraine are greater than 17 instances better than Soviet fatalities in Afghanistan through the Eighties, 11 instances better than throughout Russia’s First and Second Chechen Wars within the Nineties and 2000s, respectively, and over 5 instances better than all Russian and Soviet wars mixed since World Warfare II.”
The CSIS crew attributes the excessive Russian casualties and fatalities to things like “Russia’s failure to successfully conduct mixed arms and joint warfare, poor techniques and coaching, corruption, low morale, and Ukraine’s efficient defense-in-depth technique in a warfare that favors the protection.”
Particularly the CSIS evaluation says, “Russia’s attrition technique has accepted the prices of excessive casualties in hopes of ultimately sporting down Ukraine’s navy and society. On the battlefield, Russia has utilized dismounted infantry to put on down and attrit Ukrainian traces, together with small first-person view (FPV) drones, artillery, glide bombs, and different stand-off weapons. Russian items have routinely performed advances utilizing small squads of troops, usually poorly educated, which can be supported by armored automobiles or gentle mobility automobiles. Larger Russian headquarters incessantly order these forces to advance towards Ukrainian positions to conduct reconnaissance by drawing fireplace. If Ukrainian positions are positively recognized, Russian troopers could also be despatched ahead to assault positions, that are additional mapped after which focused with artillery, FPV drones, and glide bombs. These techniques have led to excessive fatalities and casualties.”
The Ukraine facet can be given credit score for “their defense-in-depth technique in a warfare that has largely favored the defender. Ukraine has used trenches, dragon’s tooth (anti-tank obstacles), mines, and different limitations—together with artillery and drones—to attrit advancing Russian troopers and automobiles. The japanese entrance line, as an illustration, continues to be saturated with drones. Because of this, automobile motion is troublesome inside 15 kilometers of the entrance line. Infantry troopers should as an alternative march to their positions for 10 to fifteen kilometers.”
One outcome has been Russia’s gradual fee of advance. In response to the CSIS evaluation, “Russia’s positive factors because it took the initiative in January 2024 are far smaller than the massive territorial shifts seen earlier within the warfare. On the peak of the preliminary invasion in March 2022, Russian forces seized roughly 115,000 sq. kilometers in lower than 5 weeks, however by April 2022, Ukraine had retaken greater than 35,000 sq. kilometers. By November 2022, Ukraine had retaken roughly 75,000 sq. kilometers, together with via profitable counteroffensives round [the Ukraine cities] Kharkiv and Kherson.”
Though the Russian economic system has held up higher than anticipated following U.S. and different Western nation sanctions imposed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, pressure on its economic system is beginning to present.
The CSIS evaluation says, “In 2025, Russian manufacturing declined at its quickest fee since March 2022, with contractions in output and new orders, a rising labor scarcity, and a lower in enter shopping for. Total, Russian manufacturing suffered seven consecutive months of contraction in 2025, with manufacturing ranges declining for ten consecutive months. As well as, client demand weakened and inflation was excessive.”
Jone/McCabe write there may be additionally a labor crunch, a drop in oil revenues with decrease international costs, with 2025 financial progress slowing to 0.6 p.c, whereas the Worldwide Financial Fund estimates that Russia’s progress would stay gradual, at 0.8 p.c, in 2026.
The CSIS crew additionally says Russia faces a capital drawback. Unable to borrow on worldwide markets, the Kremlin has borrowed at dwelling and raised taxes to finance the Ukraine warfare. Roughly half its price range is spent on the armed forces, the military-industrial advanced, home safety, and debt service.
“Whereas the warfare sustains jobs and industrial exercise,” the CSIS crew says, “it produces few lasting belongings or productiveness positive factors. Larger taxes burden the civilian economic system, which is already affected by double-digit rates of interest and vital labor shortages. Tank factories are working additional time, however car producers have minimize shifts.” Ammunition, uniforms, and fortifications contribute to present GDP, however they don’t enhance long-term welfare or capital formation.
In response to Jones/McCabe, “Russia additionally faces probably the most extreme demographic challenges amongst main economies, with a shrinking and getting older inhabitants, low delivery fee, excessive mortality fee (particularly amongst working-age males), and excessive fee of emigration amongst expert employees.”
One instance the place the CSIS evaluation finds Russia falling behind is in Synthetic Intelligence (AI). It factors out that Russian President Vladimir Putin as soon as predicted, “Synthetic intelligence is the longer term not solely of Russia however of all of mankind. . . . Whoever turns into the chief on this sphere will turn into the ruler of the world.” But it surely then states, “Russia at this time is a bottom-tier AI energy. It ranks 28 of 36 nations within the total energy and growth of its AI ecosystem—or AI ‘vibrancy’ — in response to Stanford College. The highest-performing Russian AI mannequin trails even older iterations of OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Google’s Gemini.”
Even worse, not a single Russian firm is among the many prime 100 expertise firms on the planet by market capitalization, whereas the U.S. leads the pack.
As for the house race, the place Russia was as soon as a pacesetter, Roscosmos, the state company answerable for the Russian house program, carried out solely 17 orbital launches in 2025, in response to the CSIS evaluation. That compares to 193 U.S. orbital launches and 92 by China. Russia’s house business additionally suffered an accident in December 2025 that brought about extreme harm to the launch pad Russia makes use of for sending astronauts and cargo to the Worldwide House Station. As well as, a 2018 Soyuz rocket carrying two astronauts failed because it headed to house; the emergency abort system carried the 2 to security.
There has additionally been a decline inside Russia in standard help inside Russia for the warfare. In response to polls cited by CSIS, in Might 2023, 57 p.c of Russians believed that most individuals of their internal social circle supported the warfare, in comparison with 39 p.c who opposed the warfare. By October 2025, 55 p.c of Russians of their internal social circle opposed the warfare, in comparison with 45 who supported the warfare.
All thi, nonetheless, has not appeared to have affected Putin, who, in response to the Jones.McCabe evaluation “stays undeterred by the excessive casualty and fatality charges, and Russia’s financial downturn is unlikely to convey the Kremlin to the negotiating desk—at the very least on phrases that might be acceptable to Ukraine or Europe.” They are saying, “Putin could also be keen to simply accept the excessive casualty and fatality numbers as a result of most of those troopers are from such areas because the Far East and North Caucasus—and never politically very important areas for him, resembling Moscow and St. Petersburg.”
As well as, the Jones/McCabe evaluation finds, “President Putin and the Russian authorities have been adept in conducting an aggressive disinformation marketing campaign that has satisfied some policymakers, together with in Washington, that Russian victory is inevitable, regardless of substantial proof on the contrary.”
The CSIS crew attributes that to Russia having “boosted its funding for state-run media in 2026 by roughly 54 p.c, indicating a dedication to intensified info warfare. The Kremlin’s propaganda machine is designed to maintain home help for the regime and its warfare in opposition to Ukraine, in addition to to persuade key international audiences that the warfare has been profitable and must proceed.”
