Yves right here. This interview with William Hartung and Ben Freeman, authors of Trillion Greenback Warfare Machine provides a excessive degree overview of the structural elements which have generated a army self-licking ice cream cone, and why that’s so pricey for the remainder of America.
By Lynn Parramore, Senior Analysis Analyst on the Institute for New Financial Considering. Initially printed on the Institute for New Financial Considering web site
$1 trillion Pentagon funds is tough to know. For scale, it might pay for a yr of U.S. public Okay–12 training, practically a yr of Social Safety retirement advantages, or greater than the whole annual budgets of most nations.
But President Trump proposes to spend that cash on the 2026 protection funds, whereas hundreds of thousands of Individuals can’t cough up the funds to see a physician.
And what can we really get for all that army cash? Security? Slicing-edge weapons tailor-made to pressing threats?
Not one of the above, argue William Hartung and Ben Freeman of their new ebook, Trillion Greenback Warfare Machine: How Runaway Army Spending Drives America into International Wars and Bankrupts Us at Dwelling. As a substitute, they reveal how what we’ve constructed is a self-feeding racket of corruption, misaligned incentives, and grift that courts catastrophic wars abroad whereas eroding democracy. It’s devouring the cash Individuals have to survive – by no means thoughts thrive.
Thomas Jefferson warned that struggle shouldn’t be solely horribly inefficient, nevertheless it “multiplies, as an alternative of indemnifying losses.” Appears to be like like we’re studying that lesson the arduous approach.
This isn’t some summary downside: as Hartung and Freeman warning, the system might fairly actually blow us all to kingdom come. Assume Kathryn Bigelow’s “Home of Dynamite” was unsettling? Wait till you learn this ebook.
Hartung and Freeman’s critique is supported by a long time of analysis. Researchers on the Institute for New Financial Considering (INET) have lengthy been peeling again the layers of presidency spending and company energy, confirming what the authors clarify: protection spending is never nearly nationwide safety.
William Lazonick’s work on company financialization exhibits how public {dollars} usually journey a one-way conveyor belt into executives’ and shareholders’ pockets by means of inventory buybacks, hovering CEO pay, and dividends, whereas innovation and industrial know-how are left behind. (Boeing provides a placing illustration of this dynamic – and Trump simply awarded it the F-47 contract).
INET analysis director Thomas Ferguson and his colleagues clarify why Congress appears to be like the opposite approach, exposing a political system rigged to favor large traders. Ferguson has additionally defined the rise of “pink tech,” a nexus the place protection, AI, and finance collide, concentrating extraordinary tech-driven political energy and reshaping each coverage and the battlefield.
In Trillion Greenback Warfare Machine, Hartung and Freeman expose how company greed, political graft, and outdated pondering have turned America’s army spending into a worldwide destabilizer and a home drain. They observe the “tech bros” racing legacy protection companies for contracts and ever-larger budgets, reveal why protection spending is a awful job creator. Their evaluation demonstrates how the system stifles innovation, with much less and fewer transparency or oversight.
Sitting down with INET’s Lynn Parramore, they unpack not simply the {dollars}, however the human and political prices of this fiasco— and what might occur if this runaway prepare isn’t stopped.
Lynn Parramore: What made you resolve to write down a ebook about how U.S. army spending works?
Ben Freeman: On the peak of the Reagan army buildup in 1985, the U.S. was spending over 100 billion {dollars} lower than we are actually. But the army was twice as massive by virtually each metric: planes, ships, troop numbers. That drove us to ask: Why is that this occurring? How are we spending extra yearly however getting much less? What’s being wasted? Why does effectiveness retains declining?
I gained’t let Reagan off the hook — there was loads of waste again then, however in the present day it’s worse. We’ve constructed an expansive, “cover-the-globe” technique, attempting to be every thing, all over the place without delay. We’re overstretched, inefficient, and spending over half of the army funds — 54% —on Pentagon contractors.
Once you mix all these elements, a transparent image emerges — what we name the “Trillion Greenback Warfare Machine” — displaying the place all this cash goes and why it’s not really making us safer.
William Hartung: Principally, we’re asking the smaller army to undertake missions inconceivable: impose democracy on the barrel of a gun, reconstruct a rustic on the similar time it’s being destroyed. We’ve had 20-year wars in Afghanistan and Iraq the place the U.S. spent extra and had superior know-how, however that didn’t decide the end result. Native circumstances, human motivation, and elements know-how can’t tackle have been what actually mattered. These two factors collectively are deeply troubling. The query of why that occurs was a variety of what we discover.
LP: Within the Nineteen Nineties, Paul Wolfowitz championed the concept the U.S. ought to by no means let a rival rise. Does it nonetheless have an effect on army spending? Is China an actual risk, or a extra of scarecrow?
William Hartung: China does problematic issues regionally, in its remedy of its folks, and in its financial technique to a level, nevertheless it’s not an existential risk to the U.S. It’s not innocent – the scarecrow has weapons — however a lot of what we’re doing is counterproductive.
We’re constructing plane carriers that could possibly be taken out by Chinese language missiles. As a substitute of working towards an understanding on Taiwan, which held for practically 40 years, we’re arguing about it. In some circles, there’s a push to “beat” China, with struggle faculties working workout routines on the right way to defeat it, relatively than the right way to use diplomacy or attain a settlement. However China isn’t Iraq or Afghanistan — it’s a big, technologically succesful, nuclear-armed nation, lots of whose capabilities haven’t even been totally deployed. There’s discuss of combating China in its personal entrance yard, removed from ours. That simply doesn’t make sense.
We’d like a extra nuanced, balanced, clever method. However concern retains the cash flowing. Some push this for that cause, whereas others genuinely see China as a risk. However from China’s perspective, it’s inconceivable to inform the distinction. All they see is aggressive rhetoric and army build-up. That should change.
China has problematic points, however that doesn’t justify constructing a brand new era of nuclear weapons, extra plane carriers, or deploying extra arms to the Pacific islands. That’s precisely the fallacious technique to deal with it.
Ben Freeman: I’d add that the military-industrial complicated is a self-fulfilling system. You possibly can’t have a trillion-dollar army funds in a peaceable world. The system wants monsters overseas, actual or imagined, to justify itself. If the common American appears to be like out and thinks, “It appears fairly peaceable, I really feel secure,” then they begin asking uncomfortable questions: why are we spending a trillion {dollars} on protection if we don’t really want it?
China’s the brand new boogeyman. Invoice’s proper — there are affordable considerations, however in the present day’s political discourse is way extra about fear-mongering than precise causes to anticipate a U.S. army conflict with China.
William Hartung: On the finish of the Chilly Warfare, Colin Powell famously stated, “We’re working out of enemies. We’re right down to Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung.” The reply was, “What about Iraq, Iran, and North Korea?” This grew to become George W. Bush’s “axis of evil.” But these nations collectively couldn’t come near matching the ability of the Soviet Union. Iran didn’t even have missiles that might attain us. On the finish of the struggle on terror, the main focus shifted to China with a report urging elevated budgets – with greater than half the fee having ties to the arms business.
It’s not that challenges don’t exist; it’s that we’re not addressing them the suitable approach.
LP: What shifts have you ever seen in newer years, particularly between the primary Trump administration and the present one?
Ben Freeman: What we’re seeing in Trump 2.0 is the rise of the tech bros. It began with big help from Elon Musk throughout the marketing campaign. Most individuals know Musk for Tesla, however SpaceX has turn out to be a significant army contractor, successful extra contracts seemingly daily. Musk is main the cost, however others are quietly influential too. J.D. Vance cites Palantir co-founder Peter Thiel as a mentor — Palantir is among the oldest protection tech firms nonetheless thriving with the Division of Protection (DoD). Then there’s Palmer Luckey at Anduril, additionally a giant Trump supporter earlier than he took workplace.
As soon as Trump 2.0 begins, he’s basically paying again these favors — Musk getting a outstanding position, Vance as vice chairman, and a surge of tech figures filling political appointee positions on the DoD. I’d say probably the most high-profile is Secretary of the Military Dan Driscoll, who comes straight from the enterprise capital tech world. He’s been one of the crucial vocal critics of the legacy protection contractors – generally known as the “primes” — and so they’ve taken notes. He’s even stated he wouldn’t be upset if the large primes went out of enterprise.
The massive distinction between Trump 1.0 and Trump 2.0 is that this protection tech takeover.
William Hartung: The tech companies are actually touchdown actual contracts. Sometimes, large firms would simply take up them, but when a agency is run by a billionaire, it will probably survive the so-called “valley of dying” between pursuing a contract and truly successful it.
Smaller companies used to battle with paperwork, whereas established firms leveraged crops in congressional districts to safe safety and a transparent benefit. That’s shifting.
There’s a battle between the 2.
Anduril has a manifesto, the “Arsenal of Democracy 2.0,” which is a fairly good takedown of the inefficiencies and issues of counting on the large 5. The argument is we’re extra nimble, cheaper and faster — true, maybe, however what are we going to make use of these weapons for? What’s our technique? Are they even going to work? Do we’ve got the applied sciences to guage them?
The important thing gamers are brazenly hawkish, and so they need not simply to promote us issues, however to form our overseas coverage and our democracy. We now have to place that apart and say: when you’ve got one thing that helps our troops, we’ll purchase it — however we gained’t allow you to dictate overseas coverage, alter our democracy, or bypass all of the methods we monitor and vet your actions. The problem is managing this new group, as a result of they may doubtless make inroads and will ultimately attain the highest of the pyramid.
LP: You’ve gotten a number of vivid examples of weapons packages gone fallacious — value overruns, failures to carry out, questions of safety, and extra. Let’s discuss in regards to the F-35. Is it too large to fail at this level?
Ben Freeman: The F-35 is the epitome of how the army ought to not purchase weapons. We’re nonetheless shopping for them in amount, although it’s clear the F-35 isn’t the aircraft of the long run. You need to look again on the origins of this system to see how failure was constructed into it. Musk really stated one thing alongside the traces of, success was by no means within the set of attainable outcomes.
LP: Not simply too large to fail however constructed to fail. Fairly damning.
Ben Freeman: Completely damning. And I believe Musk is true on this. From the beginning, the army wished a Swiss Military knife — a aircraft for everybody. We would like a fighter for the Air Power, however then the Navy says, “We’d like a fighter-bomber that may take off and land on carriers.” Then the Marines soar in too: “We’d like brief takeoff, vertical touchdown, one thing that may get out and in of tight areas, even on a provider.”
The F-35 program successfully stated sure to everybody, making a Swiss Military knife aircraft to satisfy all wants — all issues to all folks. However if you strive to do this, you find yourself with this bespoke, over-engineered factor. I’m an Eagle Scout — my Swiss Military knives appeared nice, however at any time when I wanted one particular software, it by no means actually labored that nicely. Certain, it had a knife, a noticed, a magnifying glass, however all of them sucked. That’s the F-35.
Should you’re defending the free world, that’s not the end result that you really want. That is why we are saying the F-35 program was by no means constructed to succeed.
William Hartung: They promised it will revolutionize procurement —- cheaper, able to every thing. Nevertheless it’s dangerous in any respect of it. It could possibly’t carry as many bombs as different planes, can’t help troops on the bottom, and struggles in dogfights. Conceived 23 years in the past, it nonetheless wants fixed upgrades and retrofits, and it’s within the hangar near half the time.
LP: And but, we will’t appear to do away with it.
Ben Freeman: The F-35 is a racket, and everybody’s in on it — all the ability gamers. It’s no accident that Lockheed Martin unfold F-35 manufacturing throughout 48 states. Practically each congressional district has jobs tied to constructing the aircraft. So when Lockheed lobbyists stroll into Capitol Hill places of work, they don’t hesitate to inform members precisely what number of jobs the F-35 brings to their district.
It’s successfully a mafia-style system: “Assist the F-35—or else.” The “or else” is that Lockheed lobbyists will remind constituents in these districts that their member of Congress is stepping out of line, threatening their jobs and native financial alternatives. What Lockheed has executed is unprecedented in army procurement. Each weapons program makes a jobs argument to some extent, however by no means on the scale of the F-35. That’s why in Congress you see F-35 hearings the place members trash this system and yell on the program supervisor for hours, but when the protection funds comes up, the F-35 will get full funding each time.
William Hartung: One member stated it’s like pouring cash down a rat gap, nevertheless it’s too late to cease.
LP: You be aware that the large 5 protection contractors, the primes, nonetheless have an edge in Congress over the newer Silicon Valley gamers. Are we beginning to see that stability shift?
William Hartung: It’ll take some time as a result of the benefit of the large 5 is that their factories are in congressional districts. Usually, even when they wish to retire a program, Congress gained’t allow them to. So for now, they’ll construct in parallel —like Golden Dome — utilizing old-school {hardware} however new software program, and the brand new fighter aircraft having a pilotless “wingman.”
Ultimately, that struggle will intensify. Anduril is constructing a giant plant in Ohio, J.D. Vance’s house state, so that they’ll catch up and acquire affect in Congress. Proper now, they’re sturdy within the government department, whereas old-school contractors dominate Congress. It’s in the end a political battle.
LP: The rise of “pink tech” caught some folks off guard. You be aware that the large 5 have lengthy performed each side of the aisle, relying on who’s in energy. However now pink tech brazenly aligns with the Trump administration, backing figures like Vance. Are there new dangers on this newly partisan protection business?
Ben Freeman: I believe it’s monumental. This wasn’t Trump waking up in the future and saying, “Tech is grand—mea culpa, let’s deliver the tech guys in.” No, this began with tech courting Trump. That cash confirmed up throughout the marketing campaign, and love him or hate him, Trump is transactional. As soon as the cash began flowing, tech gained actual prominence. If I have been at certainly one of these companies, I’d be ecstatic in regards to the entry and the shifts on the DoD that clearly profit tech over the outdated guard.
What actually considerations me is what comes subsequent — beginning round 2026, when there’s an actual likelihood the Home flips, the Senate flips, or probably each. If these flip blue, what occurs then? After which there’s 2028. Trump is deeply underwater proper now, and there’s no clear, well-liked successor. So what occurs if a Democrat wins the presidency and “pink tech” all of the sudden finds itself on the skin, with all of the modifications it benefited from below Trump probably drying up?
My prediction is that we’ll see the affect operation shift blue. You possibly can already see hints of it. Anduril, for instance, is lobbying aggressively, with greater than 40 lobbyists on workers. Their roster continues to be very pink, nevertheless it’s beginning to shift a little bit blue. I anticipate to see the identical with SpaceX and Palantir within the subsequent few years.
William Hartung: One cause tech is all-in on Trump and Republicans proper now’s that they anticipate the extent of regulation they need — not simply the paperwork, however impartial testing and safeguards in opposition to value gouging. If there’s a Democratic president, they’ll attempt to construct these ties, nevertheless it’ll require some backtracking and a few mea culpas. Nonetheless, they’ve loads assets to affect policymakers.
LP: Innovation is commonly used to justify larger protection spending, however you argue that the system really stifles innovation. Are you able to clarify that?
Ben Freeman: My analogy is that for many years the DoD has had an autoimmune response to innovation —or to anybody who challenges the primes, progressive or not. That response exhibits up in a few methods.
A technique this performs out, as Invoice talked about, is that when a smaller protection contractor begins to rise, the primes simply purchase it and fold it in. One other approach is by stifling innovation from the within. They recreation the acquisition course of. The federal acquisition laws run over 2,000 pages, so it’s no accident these companies rent lots of of former acquisition officers to assist them bid on contracts —typically on contracts those self same officers helped write. They have been insiders.
It’s a round system that, for many years, was designed to maintain newcomers out. Earlier than Musk had any position within the Trump administration, he was working SpaceX, which needed to sue its approach into being allowed to bid on DoD contracts due to how noncompetitive the system was. SpaceX now handles greater than 80 % of U.S. authorities area payloads, nevertheless it needed to sue to get there.
William Hartung: It doesn’t should value more cash should you do away with the outdated techniques that aren’t vital — plane carriers, heavy tanks, the large nuclear build-up. Golden Dome isn’t going to do what’s urged: it must be a lot smaller. Should you have been capable of do all these issues you would spend money on innovation, in all probability at a decrease funds. However should you can’t do away with them, then the innovation cash has to come back on prime of that. That’s form of the place we are actually.
LP: How do you tackle the concept protection spending creates jobs? What’s the counter argument?
William Hartung: It’s really a horrible job creator. There are jobs, however the business itself has acknowledged that three a long time in the past there have been three million jobs straight constructing weapons, however now there’s about a million.
Different investments create extra jobs. Should you tie up expert employees and engineers in weapons manufacturing, they aren’t engaged on local weather change, public well being, or constructing extra environment friendly infrastructure. The end result is a large value to the way forward for the economic system.
The issue is that they’re entrenched. It’s not the numbers, it’s the place they’re. Most members of the Armed Companies and Appropriations Committees have some sort of army facility of their district. For some, that’s why they joined the committee —so the cash retains flowing. It’s a political downside. It’s not a lot an financial downside, as a result of should you had the liberty to place your cash the place you get probably the most financial suggestions, the weapons business can be very low on the listing. Nevertheless it’s sort of their final line of protection.
Ben Freeman: The protection business has employed lots of people as a result of, for many years, it has obtained monumental quantities of funding. What would have occurred if that cash had been used in a different way — or if we began utilizing a few of it in a different way now. Within the president’s “Large Lovely” invoice alone, there’s over $100 billion in further funding for the DoD.
What if we invested it in different sectors, different public priorities? A big physique of analysis exhibits that shifting authorities spending from protection to those areas produces higher financial outcomes: extra jobs, larger financial multipliers, and broader advantages throughout the U.S. The proof could be very clear, and also you don’t have to be an economist to grasp it.
When you concentrate on what we construct by investing within the DoD, we’re constructing issues designed to blow up. If they really work, they’re gone. However should you construct a highway, companies can use it, commerce can transfer. Should you spend money on healthcare, individuals are more healthy and so they’re extra productive. These sorts of investments have financial multiplier results that protection spending merely doesn’t have.
If we simply took among the further cash earmarked for protection and tried investing it elsewhere, we might see how rather more it helps the economic system.
William Hartung: The issue is that some localities should struggle arduous to maintain these jobs. For instance, Groton, Connecticut, makes submarines, typically receiving a billion {dollars} a yr. If that funding disappears with no different funding, you may need a union machinist looking for work as a greeter at a on line casino, and discovering out even that’s not accessible. There must be a transition plan to assist these communities redirect into the broader economic system and maintain themselves.
LP: Does the struggle machine because it’s presently structured worsen inequality within the U.S.?
William Hartung: It helps foster it, as a result of the cash that goes there doesn’t go to social packages, to job coaching, to different locations folks might get work.
The business was closely unionized. Now some firms are solely about 10% unionized, and unions have accepted two-tier contracts. Some submarine employees are even searching for backed housing. The concept of those nice, well-paid manufacturing unit jobs is eroding. And since it’s precluding funding that would cut the financial hole, it’s a contributor to the issue.
Ben Freeman: I can’t assist however discover the pay hole between a mean enlisted service member and protection contractor executives. Some CEOs now obtain extraordinary compensation—$10 million, $20 million, even one we discovered at $80 million a yr. In the meantime, many service members, particularly E3s and E4s beginning households, face meals insecurity. About one in 4 at that degree are actually going hungry.
Your query about inequality is spot on. On the similar time we’ve got this extraordinary degree of spending, there’s an absurd degree of inequality on this area. How does this make sense? How is that this disconnect so sturdy?
William Hartung: This inflexible system of shopping for based mostly on location signifies that whether or not you’re a hawk, a reformer, or a peacenik, the system doesn’t work. Should you’re shopping for due to location, you’ll be able to’t align it with technique. If the technique is to construct one system and do away with one other, the system prevents that. In that approach, I believe everybody has an curiosity in altering how we make these selections.
LP: What actually considerations you when you concentrate on your youngsters and their security?
William Hartung: The know-how itself — if it’s used and not using a human within the loop — might make leaders extra inclined to make use of power. We’re not going to lose troops, however it can do injury on the opposite facet, which might make struggle extra doubtless. If this know-how have been used to manage nuclear weapons, the possibilities of failure can be larger, as a result of complicated software program can fail. And then you definitely mix that with the outlooks of among the captains of the business, who’re rather more aggressive.
A few of them even consider democracy is out of date: let’s repair it with tech. There’s this urge to make use of unproven know-how to resolve virtually something. Alex Karp, the president of Palantir, has a ebook referred to as The Technological Republic, the place he argues that we’ve turn out to be a nation of slackers, simply gaming and watching actuality TV, and that we want a unifying nationwide mission. His thought is a Manhattan Mission for the army functions of AI. I might suppose a terrific nation would desire a extra expansive, nourishing mission — higher training, a more healthy inhabitants, extra creativity, extra unity — not simply constructing one other widget or gadget.
Ben Freeman: Protection is among the greatest drivers of the nationwide debt as a result of it’s one of many largest line gadgets within the federal funds. We’re now including greater than a trillion {dollars} a yr — greater than the whole DoD funds — and we’ve reached the purpose the place debt service, the curiosity funds alone, exceeds the DoD’s complete funds.
We’re spending on protection like drunken sailors, and the nationwide debt retains hovering. There comes some extent — one thing we’ve seen in societies around the globe — the place nations spend themselves into oblivion by devoting an excessive amount of of their assets to the army. The Soviet Union is a basic instance. Inevitably, there comes some extent the place that turns into unsustainable. That’s a generational burden that we’re going to placed on our kids. It simply narrows our choices as a nation.
