There are 400 nuclear missile silos within the central United States that represent the land-based element of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The Minuteman III missiles within the silos are roughly 50 years previous. Though they’ve been repeatedly upgraded over time, the Air Power determined a alternative must be developed. The brand new missile underneath improvement, the Sentinel, has was a basic case of a mismanaged weapons program.
Minuteman missile in silo – time to retire?
The preliminary idea of the Sentinel missile program was to straight substitute the Minuteman III missiles within the current launch silos. By reusing the silos, the undertaking was made value aggressive with the choice of one other life extension for Minuteman or a swap to a cellular missile idea. Though initially Boeing and Northrup Grumman competed for the contract, Boeing withdrew in 2019 and Northrop grew to become the only bidder. Projected prices started to climb sharply after this level and in January, 2024, the Air Power notified Congress that the Sentinel program’s prices had exceeded baseline projections by greater than 25%, constituting a crucial Nunn-McCurdy value restrict breach. This breach mandated a proper evaluate and certification course of to find out whether or not this system ought to proceed.
In July of 2024, the Division of Protection accomplished its Nunn-McCurdy evaluate. The Underneath Secretary of Protection for Acquisition and Sustainment licensed that the Sentinel program met the required standards to proceed. Nonetheless, he rescinded this system’s Milestone B approval and directed a restructuring to handle value overruns and administration points. It stays to be seen whether or not Northrup Grumman will make substantial modifications to curtail the price of this system.
Digging for {Dollars}
Essentially the most exceptional improvement in the midst of the runaway value estimates for the Sentinel missile is the latest resolution to construct new silos as an alternative of reusing the present ones. In Might 2025, the U.S. Air Power introduced that the Sentinel ICBM program would require the development of totally new missile silos, including billions to the price of the undertaking. This resolution was made after assessments revealed that the growing older Minuteman III silos, some approaching 100 years previous by the tip of Sentinel’s anticipated service life, couldn’t be adequately tailored for the brand new missiles. Elements comparable to structural degradation and the necessity for intensive modernization had been the idea of the willpower that constructing new silos was extra sensible and cost-effective than retrofitting the previous ones.
Minuteman silo complicated – too onerous to repair?
Asserting that “structural degradation” has occurred in bolstered concrete constructions designed to outlive a near-miss by a nuclear weapon is puzzling to say the least. Furthermore, the notion that fashionable fiber optic linked management infrastructure couldn’t be retrofitted in constructions accommodating far bulkier analog cabling and previous digital methods is extremely questionable. As well as, there’s a elementary concern concerning silo building: fashionable nuclear missiles are correct sufficient to destroy even essentially the most robustly constructed silo. The accuracy of ICBMs is now inside 30-50 meters of a goal. There isn’t any possible silo design that may survive a close to hit (inside 100-200 meters) by a contemporary earth-penetrating nuclear warhead. This makes makes an attempt to enhance on the hardening of current silos pointless. The survivability of missile silos is now largely a delusion sustained by institutional inertia and protection contracting incentives.
Minuteman missile web site places
The Mischievous Magic of Nuclear Deterrence
Maybe the best boon conferred on the protection trade by the nuclear period is the elusive idea of deterrence. Like Schrodinger’s cat, it exists concurrently in two contradictory states. It’s at all times completely very important, but perennially inadequate. Its advocates preserve that it’s working faultlessly as a result of we now have been spared nuclear assault, whereas concurrently sustaining that we’re in imminent hazard of dropping deterrence until we spend massive sums to protect it. The magical property of deterrence is that there isn’t a measurable connection between cash spent on deterrence and the corresponding quantity of deterrence secured. It’s because deterrence exists within the minds of potential attackers, whose psychology is unknown and unknowable. But deterrence is deemed so vital that it features as a serious justification for any new nuclear weapons program. The deterrence argument has grow to be a fountain of riches for the makers of strategic nuclear weapons.
Magical fascinated by deterrence is abundantly displayed within the doubtful design selections of the Sentinel missile program. Initially supposed as a easy alternative for the ageing Minuteman III land based mostly missiles, Sentinel has was a runaway weapons program, with projected prices drastically exceeding preliminary estimates. Sentinel program advocates invoke the magic of deterrence as justification for each expensive function added to the missile. They argue {that a} larger payload, longer vary, and extra survivable silos will all add to deterrence, so why ought to we quibble over one other hundred billion {dollars}?
Improvement Danger vs. Improvement Grift
There’s a professional argument for accepting danger in weapons improvement if the purpose is a quantum leap in functionality. The event of stealthy fight plane supplied a measurable navy benefit over potential adversaries, and thus value and schedule overruns of those applications might be defended to a point. Nonetheless, the Sentinel program, like a number of different mismanaged U.S. weapons applications, doesn’t ship a major new functionality however gives doubtful “enhancements” at monumental expense. Protection contractors, navy leaders, and politicians all have incentives to overstate the worth of such applications and understate their prices, realizing that after began the momentum of an enormous weapons undertaking is tough to cease. This drawback doesn’t finish with the event of the weapon. The grift that retains on giving is the lifecycle value, the price of supporting a weapon system throughout its operational lifetime. This value can also be chronically underestimated, and the principle beneficiary is once more the protection contractor. There may be cause to imagine that Sentinel will observe this sample and have lifecycle prices exceeding present estimates of $250-$300 billion.
Conclusion
The Sentinel missile program is yet one more mismanaged U.S. weapons program exhibiting the continual flaws of a procurement system distorted by perverse vendor incentives and failed governmental oversight. The Secretary of Protection ought to instantly order modifications to the Sentinel missile program to make the most of the present Minuteman launch infrastructure, with minimal required modifications of current amenities. Since no silos can survive assault by fashionable ICBMs, constructing new silos would drastically inflate the price of this system whereas including little operational functionality. The willingness of the present Protection Secretary to make these modifications might be a take a look at of the Trump administration’s seriousness in eliminating waste in authorities operations. If the Protection Division doesn’t act to include the price of this program, Congress ought to make continued funding contingent on implementing a sound design strategy based mostly on an impartial evaluate by consultants exterior the affect of the Pentagon and the contractor. Northrup Grumman ought to heed some frequent sense recommendation: If you end up in a gap, cease digging.
